Submission to Parliament on the review of section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 by Slade, B. V. et al.
  
 
 
 
 
  
©BV Slade 
15 JUNE 2018 
Not to be copied, distributed or cited without the authors’ prior written permission 
The views expressed here are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the 
affiliated institutions. 
 
 
Submission to Parliament on the review of section 25 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 
 
 Prof BV Slade (bvslade@sun.ac.za / 021 808 3195); Associate Professor; Faculty 
of Law, Stellenbosch University 
 Prof JM Pienaar (jmp@sun.ac.za / 021 808 3199); Professor; Faculty of Law, 
Stellenbosch University 
 Prof ZT Boggenpoel (zsazsa@sun.ac.za / 021 808 3195); Professor and South 
African Research Chair in Property Law, Faculty of Law, Stellenbosch University 
 Ms T Kotzé (tinakotze@sun.ac.za / 021 808 2990); Doctoral candidate; Faculty of 
Law, Stellenbosch University  
INTRODUCTION 
On the 27th of February 2018, the National Assembly adopted a motion to review 
section 25 and other relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, to permit the state to expropriate land in the public interest without paying 
compensation. The Constitutional Review Committee, mandated by the National 
Assembly, has invited written submissions on this matter. We hereby submit our 
submission on the motion to review section 25 and other relevant provisions. We are 
also prepared to make oral representation if the need arises.  
 
BACKGROUND 
The motion to review section 25 of the 1996 Constitution was proposed by the 
Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). The African National Congress (ANC) proposed 
several amendments to the EFF’s motion, both with regard to the reasons for the 
review, and the mandate of the Constitutional Review Committee. The amended 
motion, as proposed by the ANC, was adopted by the National Assembly. The reasons 
proffered for, or underlying, the mandate to review section 25 and any other clauses 
to permit the state to expropriate land in the public interest without compensation 
include the following: 
 South Africa has a unique history with regard to land dispossession. 
 Black ownership of land in South Africa during apartheid was capped at 13%. 
 Skewed patterns of landownership have negative social, political and economic 
consequences.  
 Various challenges and difficulties impede the achievement of land reform 
targets.  
In terms of EFF’s original motion, section 25 was placed ‘at the centre of the present 
crises regarding the resolution of the land question’,1 since it protects private property 
rights and requires compensation to be paid in the event that an expropriation takes 
place. The EFF’s motion did not refer to the constitutional standard of just and equitable 
compensation. The ANC, however, took a more nuanced approach. In its amendment 
to the EFF’s motion, the ANC recognised that policy instruments (such as the willing-
buyer-willing-seller policy) and other provisions of section 25 may be hindering 
effective land reform.2 The acknowledgement on the part of the National Assembly that 
                                                          
1 Minutes of Proceedings of the National Assembly on Tuesday 27 February [No 3 – 2018: Fifth session, 
Fifth Parliament] page 8. 
2 Pienaar JM Land Reform 226, 342-343, 819-820; Lahiff E “Willing Buyer, Willing Seller: South Africa’s 
Failed Experiment in Market-led Agrarian Reform” (2007) 28 Third World Quarterly 1585; Dlamini SRA 
policy instruments may be hindering the effective implementation of land reform is to 
be welcomed. In the Report of the High Level Panel on the Assessment of Key 
Legislation and the Acceleration of Fundamental Change (High Level Panel Report) it 
is stated that the policy shifts with regard to land reform, particularly in the area of land 
redistribution, have contributed greatly to the lack of any meaningful change in 
landownership patterns.3 Although the willing-buyer-willing-seller principle is regarded 
as an obstacle to effectively implement land redistribution,4 it is important to emphasise 
that this principle is not contained in section 25. As retired Justice Sachs stated in his 
submission to the High Level Panel: ‘It [the Constitution] contains no willing seller, 
willing buyer principle, the application of which could make expropriation 
unaffordable.’5 A willing-buyer-willing-seller principle is in fact, as will be further 
discussed below, at odds with the state’s power to expropriate, as expropriation occurs 
without the consent of the owner concerned.6 In his submission to the panel, retired 
Justice Moseneke stated that ‘[t]he willingness of the buyer and/or of the seller may 
facilitate a smooth transaction, but does not seem to be a constitutional requirement.’7 
Therefore, the application of the willing-buyer-willing-seller principle, which is not a 
constitutional requirement, and in fact has hindered effective land reform, cannot be 
relied upon to amend section 25.8 In order to justify any amendment of section 25 (and 
potentially other clauses) to make it possible for the state to expropriate land in the 
public interest without compensation, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of 
the operation and ambit of section 25.  
This submission sets out the operation and ambit of section 25 of the 
Constitution in relation to the mandate given to the Constitutional Review Committee. 
It therefore proceeds by posing questions in relation to certain statements that are 
drawn from the motion. In this regard it will be shown that an amendment of section 25 
is not necessary to effectively implement land reform. If section 25 is exhausted to its 
                                                          
Taking Land Reform Seriously: From Willing Seller-willing Buyer to Expropriation LLM thesis, University 
of Cape Town (2014); White Paper on South African Land Policy Part 4: Land Reform Programmes. 
3 Report of the High Level Panel on the Assessment of key legislation and the acceleration of 
fundamental change (November 2017) 206 onwards, available at 
https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Pages/2017/october/High_Level_Panel/HLP_Report
/HLP_report.pdf (accessed 06-06-2018). 
4 Pienaar JM Land Reform (2014) 34. 
5 Report of the High Level Panel (2017) 206. 
6 See discussion below. 
7 Report of the High Level Panel (2017) 206. 
8 The willing-buyer-willing-seller principle is applicable in relation to the determination of market value, 
which is only one of the factors set out in section 25(3) of the Constitution. With regard to the acquisition 
of property for land reform purposes this principle has already been adjusted under the Property 
Valuation Act 17 of 2014, which commenced on 1 July 2014. 
full potential, the possibility exists that the amount of compensation can fluctuate to the 
extent that it becomes possible to recognise very little or minimal compensation. 
Furthermore, since the motion is silent with regard to the amendment of ‘other 
provisions’ in the Constitution to allow expropriation of land in the public interest without 
compensation, we argue that the amendment of section 25(2) to allow for expropriation 
without compensation also necessitates the amendment of other provisions, 
specifically in the bill of rights. The far-reaching implications of amending these other 
provisions are not discussed in detail, but are highlighted in order to strengthen the 
argument that an amendment of section 25 to allow for expropriation without 
compensation is not advisable as it requires a review and amendment of potentially 
the entire design of the bill of rights. In the end, it is submitted that the determination 
of just and equitable compensation, as is currently required by the Constitution, must 
be given further content and clarity in legislation.  
  
 
In order to address this question, it is necessary to set out the structure of section 25. 
Section 25 is divided into two main parts. The first part (s 25(1)-(3)) protects existing 
property from arbitrary deprivation, and requires an expropriation to satisfy certain 
requirements.9 The second part (s 25(5)-(9)) contains the transformative thrust of the 
clause as it is aimed at reforming property law generally and land (and natural 
resources) specifically.10 Section 25(4) is an interpretive provision that applies to both 
parts. Since the second part of section 25 provides the constitutional mandate for land 
reform in particular, it is unlikely that amending any provision in that part would 
accelerate land reform. In his remarks to the High Level Panel, retired Justice Sachs 
                                                          
9 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3rd ed 2011) 12. However, the constitutional protection 
of property is not absolute and may be subjected to regulatory limitations. See Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional Property Law (3rd ed 2011) 190; Badenhorst P, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 2006) 96; Mostert & Pope (eds) The Principles of The Law of 
Property 116. See also First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services 2002 4 SA 768 (CC)  paras 49-50; Offit Enterprises v Coega Development 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2011 1 SA 293 (CC) para 46 in this regard. 
10 Sections 25(5)-(9) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See also Van der Walt 
AJ Constitutional Property Law (3rd ed 2011) 12. 
The motion specifically refers to the amendment of section 25 of the Constitution to 
allow expropriation without compensation. A question that should be asked is whether 
the whole of section 25 or only certain parts of section 25 be reviewed and possibly 
amended to make expropriation without compensation possible. 
 
re-iterated that the Constitution is not a ‘barrier to radical land restitution, … in fact [it] 
requires and facilitates extensive and progressive programmes of land reform.’11 The 
Constitution, particularly the second part of section 25, is therefore the driving force for 
radical land reform. As the High Level Panel’s report pointed out, it is the lack of clear 
and effective implementation of coherent policy that hinders land reform.12 Even in the 
amended motion, the ANC conceded that certain policy choices may hinder land 
reform. It is therefore unlikely that the idea is to amend the second part of section 25, 
since it provides for land and other related reform and does not specifically refer to 
expropriation and compensation for land reform purposes. Furthermore, section 25(8) 
makes it clear that ‘[n]o provision of this section [which would include the first part of 
section 25] may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve 
land, water, and related reform’. 
It is more likely that the motion to review and amend is focused on the first part of 
section 25, commonly referred to as the protective provision in section 25.13 In this 
regard it is important to set out clearly the first part of section 25 and how the 
Constitutional Court has interpreted its provisions. Section 25(1) prevents an arbitrary 
deprivation: 
‘No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.’  
 
Section 25(2) in turn, permits the expropriation of property, provided it is authorised 
in legislation, is for a public purpose or in the public interest, and that just and equitable 
compensation follows the expropriation. Section 25(3) deals with compensation and 
reads as follows:  
‘The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be 
just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest 
and the interests of those affected having regard to all relevant circumstances’. 
 
Section 25(3) lists certain factors that should be taken into account to calculate just 
and equitable compensation.  
Deprivation connotes the interference with regard to the use, enjoyment and 
exploitation of property by the state. The state may by way of regulation interfere with 
the use, enjoyment and exploitation of property, provided that such a regulation does 
                                                          
11 Report of the High Level Panel 206. 
12 See also Pienaar JM Land Reform (2014) 850-858; JM Pienaar ‘Reflections on the South African 
Land Reform Programme: Characteristics, Dichotomies and Tensions Part 2’ 2014 4 TSAR 689-705. 
13 This also ties in with the EFF’s original motion that section 25 hinders land reform in that it requires 
an expropriation to be compensated. 
not constitute an arbitrary deprivation. In terms of the state’s police powers, the state 
therefore regulates property to ‘protect public health and safety or other, similar public 
interests’.14 Since the interference with property is for public health, safety, and similar 
public interests, and since members of society are equally affected by the regulation, 
compensation is not payable. Therefore, section 25(1) of the Constitution does 
generally not require the state to compensate property owners in cases where 
regulatory action constitutes a deprivation. A deprivation that is found to be arbitrary is 
invalid unless it can be saved by section 36(1), the limitation clause. However, given 
the test for arbitrariness as is discussed further below, it seems unlikely that an 
arbitrary deprivation would be saved from invalidity in terms of section 36(1).15  
Expropriation on the other hand, usually connotes the acquisition of property by the 
state for public purposes, such as building roads, dams, and transportation ports. Since 
specific property may be required to realise the purpose of the expropriation, there is 
a duty on the state to compensate the owner whose property is expropriated as that 
particular property owner alone has to give up his/her property in order to benefit the 
broader society.  
One of the contentious issues in constitutional property law is the distinction 
between deprivation and expropriation and how this impacts on the application of 
section 25(1) and section 25(2) respectively. In the First National Bank16 (FNB) 
decision, the Constitutional Court argued that deprivation is a wide form of interference 
with property, and that expropriation is a subset of deprivation. All expropriations are 
therefore also deprivations, but not all deprivations are expropriations. The 
Constitutional Court has therefore indicated that the inquiry into the validity of any 
interference with property must start with section 25(1).17 Therefore, even in cases 
where it is clear that the interference is an expropriation, the validity of the interference 
must first be determined with reference to the requirements for a valid deprivation in 
terms of section 25(1). Academic authors have persuasively argued that a property 
inquiry that starts with section 25(1) will be lawful or unlawful based on whether the 
deprivation is arbitrary.18 This is due to the test described by the Court to determine 
                                                          
14 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3rd ed 2011) 213. 
15 See also Roux T ‘Property’ in Woolman S, Bishop M & Brickhill J (eds) Constitutional Law of South 
Africa Vol 3 (2nd ed OS 2003) Cape Town: Juta ch 46. 
16 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
17 FNB para 46. 
18 Roux T ‘Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa vol 3 
(2 ed OS 2003) ch 46; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3rd ed 2011) 74-78. 
arbitrariness.19 That means that the validity of any deprivation or expropriation would 
be determined in terms of the arbitrariness test. By way of example: An expropriation 
that is not undertaken for a public purpose or in the public interest would not survive 
the arbitrariness test, and would be invalidated in terms of section 25(1), without having 
been subjected to the requirements in section 25(2).20 Similarly, an expropriation that 
is not compensated, may already be found to be arbitrary in terms of section 25(1).21 
Adopting this position, may have important implications for the review and possible 
amendment of section 25, since expropriation without compensation would be invalid 
based on the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of property. Despite any 
reference to expropriation in section 25(1), an expropriation without compensation can 
in theory be attacked on the basis that it constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property 
in conflict with section 25(1). However, section 25(1) arguably serves a different 
purpose, and should only be relied on in cases where the interference with property is 
not an expropriation that is authorised in legislation (a discussion on the requirements 
of expropriation follows below). In cases where there is a regulation of property that 
causes a deprivation and in cases where it is unclear whether an interference is a 
deprivation or expropriation, then the inquiry into the validity should start with section 
25(1).  
Therefore, in cases where the state uses its power of expropriation to expropriate 
property, section 25(1) should be bypassed and the inquiry can start with section 25(2). 
This is exactly the type of cases to which the motion refers; expropriation of land in the 
public interest. There are also examples in case law, where the courts have ignored 
the position as outlined in FNB to start all disputes regarding the interference with 
property with section 25(1) and proceeded straight to consider whether the 
expropriation complies with the requirements in section 25(2). Therefore, in cases 
where property has been expropriated formally,22 courts tend to forego the FNB 
methodology of starting with section 25(1). In cases where it is questioned whether the 
                                                          
19 In FNB para 100 the arbitrariness test was set out as follow: ‘Having regard to what has gone before, 
it is concluded that a deprivation of property is 'arbitrary' as meant by s 25 when the 'law' referred to in 
s 25(1) does not provide sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in question or is procedurally 
unfair.’ The Court then set out certain factors to determine whether sufficient reason exists for the 
deprivation. 
20 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3rd ed 2011) 74-78. 
21 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3rd ed 2011) 74-78. 
22 A formal expropriation would be where an expropriation notice has been served on an owner in terms 
of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. 
expropriation is for a public purpose or in the public interest,23 or if the amount, time 
and manner of payment of compensation is questioned,24 courts have rightly ignored 
FNB and proceeded directly to consider whether the requirements set out in section 
25(2) were complied with. It is submitted, that in cases where property has been 
expropriated formally, section 25(1) should be bypassed; and the requirements in 
section 25(2) of the Constitution must be satisfied. In this regard, Dugard and Seme 
argue that ‘expropriation is a distinct sub-set of deprivation requiring a separate 
investigation.’25  
However, even if that argument is accepted, the possibility remains open that if 
section 25(2) is amended to explicitly permit expropriation without compensation, a 
litigant may still be successful in arguing that the expropriation, as a total interference 
with his/her property, constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property in terms of section 
25(1), and hence invalid. However, if a clearer distinction between deprivation and 
expropriation is accepted, or that the expropriation of property need only pass scrutiny 
under section 25(2) it may be that an amendment of section 25(2) (and other sections 
in the Constitution)26 would make it possible for the state to expropriate land without 
compensation. If an amendment of section 25(2) is therefore contemplated, it must first 
be determined, and made clear, what section 25(2) actually permits.  
Section 25(2) does not prohibit state interference with existing property interests. It 
simply dictates to the state the requirements that it needs to fulfil to lawfully expropriate 
property. The state has the power to expropriate property for achieving legitimate state 
goals.27 If the state wants to implement a specific project that would serve the general 
public’s interest, such as preserving catchment areas or building roads, and it needs 
specific land to implement the project, the state can negotiate with the owner(s) for the 
sale of the land. It is in fact advisable that the state first offer to buy the land from the 
owner. If, however, the owner refuses to sell the land, the state can proceed to 
expropriate the land. The power of expropriation exists essentially to prevent a private 
property owner from holding-out and in the process prevent an important and 
                                                          
23 Erf 16 Bryntirion (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works [2011] ZASCA 246, 1 December 2011; Bartsch 
Consult (Pty) Ltd v Mayoral Committee of the Maluti-A-Phofung Municipality [2010] ZAFSHC 11, 4 
February 2010 
24 See Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC), where the Constitutional Court only 
focussed on determining the appropriate amount of compensation in line with section 25(2) and the 
National Roads Act.  
25 Dugard J & Seme N ‘Property Rights in Court: An Examination of Judicial Attempts to Settle Section 
25’s Balancing Act re Restitution and Expropriation’ (2018) 34 SAJHR 43. 
26 See below. 
27 See for instance s 40 of the South African National Roads Agency Limited and National Roads Act 7 
of 1998. 
potentially crucial project from being realised. For that reason, expropriation is 
regarded as an original form of acquisition of ownership; meaning that the consent of 
the property owner is not required.28 Therefore, if the owner refuses to sell his/her 
property to the state voluntarily, the state need not continue negotiating with the owner; 
it can summarily expropriate property, provided that the requirements in legislation and 
the Constitution are adhered to.  
In the expropriation context, it is important to draw a distinction between the 
lawfulness/legitimacy/validity of an expropriation on the one hand and the 
consequence of a valid expropriation, on the other. An expropriation is valid if effected 
in terms of authorising legislation, and if it is undertaken for a public purpose or in the 
public interest. That means an administrator (a minister or another functionary) must 
be authorised in legislation to expropriate property, and that expropriation must be for 
a public purpose or in the public interest.  
In the land reform context, a variety of legislative measures provide specifically for 
expropriation of property for land reform purposes, including: 
 sections 10, 10A and 12 of the Land Reform: Provision of Land and Assistance 
Act 126 of 1993;29 
 section 26 of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997;30 
 sections 22, 35, 42A, 42C, and specifically section 42E, of the Restitution of 
Land Rights Act 22 of 1994; and  
 section 3 of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996. 
 
Where land for housing is concerned, Part 4, section 9 of the Housing Act 107 of 199731 
specifically provides for the expropriation thereof.  At provincial level the Eastern Cape 
Land Disposal Act 7 of 2000 also makes provision for the expropriation of land by the 
Premier of the province under section 2. 
                                                          
28 See Badenhorst P, Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (5th ed 
2006) 173.   
29 For both redistribution and tenure reform purposes – see (former) Department of Land Affairs 
document: Policy and Procedures for Expropriation of Land, signed by the Minister on 22 March, 1999. 
30 For both redistribution and tenure reform purposes – see (former) Department of Land Affairs 
document: Policy and Procedures for Expropriation of Land, signed by the Minister on 22 March, 1999. 
31 Local Government is herewith authorised to expropriate land for purposes of housing, aligned with 
the procedure set out in the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. 
With regard to envisaged legislative measures clause 26 of the Regulation of 
Agricultural Land Holdings Bill,32 a measure that stands to make a massive impact in 
future, also provides specifically for expropriation.  
Expropriation for purposes of land reform, which involves expropriating property for 
transfer to third parties is an expropriation in the public interest.33 This is specifically 
provided for in the wording of section 25(4): 
‘the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to 
reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources.’34 
 
Therefore, any expropriation of property for purposes of land reform, which is 
authorised in legislation will be valid in terms of the requirements of section 25(2).  
Once the requirements for an expropriation, namely authorisation by legislation and 
for a public purpose or in the public interest, have been complied with, the expropriation 
is deemed valid, and then, only then, does the question of compensation follow.  
This has important implications: The validity of an expropriation cannot be attacked 
because the compensation is not, according to the owner, sufficient, or below market 
value (see comment below). The validity of the expropriation can only be attacked if 
not authorised in legislation, adopted in a procedurally unfair manner, or not 
undertaken for a public purpose or in the public interest. If the owner is not satisfied 
with the amount of compensation that the state offers (after the parties were unable to 
agree on the amount of compensation) then the owner is free to approach a court for 
relief in terms of section 25(2)(b).  
 
 
                                                          
32 GN 229 in GG 40697 of 17 March 2017. Also see Pienaar JM “Land reform” Juta Quarterly Review 
2017 (1). 
33 Third party transfers occur when the state uses its power to expropriate property from one private 
owner and transfer the property to another private owner. Expropriation involving a third party transfer 
is mandated in the current Expropriation Act, see s 3, which allows the state to expropriate property on 
behalf of a juristic person if such juristic person requires the property for a public purposes. An example 
of a juristic person who may approach the minister to expropriate property on its behalf is a university, 
who require property for public purposes. 
34 During the time that the Interim Constitution was in force, there was concern that expropriation for 
land reform purposes, which involves third party transfers, would not be justifiable in light of the fact that 
section 28 of the Interim Constitution, only referred to expropriation for a public purpose. There was 
authority in case law (Administrator, Transvaal and Another v Van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pty) Ltd 
1990 (4) SA 644 (A)) to the effect that an expropriation involving a third party transfer cannot be for a 
public purpose. This concern was resolved by the insertion of the phrase ‘public interest’ in section 25 
of the 1996 Constitution and by adding section 25(4)(a) as quoted above. 
The motion refers to the expropriation of land in the public interest. What would the situation 
be with regard to an expropriation of land for a public purpose? 
 The motion refers to the expropriation of land without compensation. Section 25(4)(b)of 
the Constitution makes it clear that ‘property is not limited to land’. Given that the 
constitutional concept of ‘property’ is not limited to land, but includes various categories 
of property interests,35 the motion to review section 25 presumably does not extend to 
the expropriation of property other than land without compensation. The ambit of the 
motion would therefore not permit an amendment of section 25 that would allow the 
expropriation of property other than land without compensation.  
However, what exactly would be included under ‘land’ would have be to be clearly 
defined. In his reply to the National Assembly on 14 March 2018, President 
Ramaphosa indicated that land reform should not only focus on meeting the needs of 
the poor on ‘rural agricultural land.’ Ramaphosa stated that ‘[w]e should take steps to 
address the property rights of people living in informal settlements and in inner-city 
buildings with absentee landlords. We need to develop a clear strategy to dispose of 
under-utilised public owned land for inclusive urban development – to bring poor 
people from the periphery into the centre of the cities.’36 Given that President 
Ramaphosa also stated that expropriation without compensation should be 
implemented in a manner that does not impede agricultural production and food 
security, the exact parameters of what would be included under ‘land’ need to be made 
clear. Does it refer to rural land, (which includes agricultural land) and urban land, and 
what would the impact be if land, (with permanent fixtures like houses or a block of 
flats) is expropriated without compensation? 
The motion also refers to expropriation of land in the public interest. No reference 
is made to the expropriation of land for a public purpose. Public interest is said to be a 
broader category than public purpose.37 The expropriation for public purposes would 
refer to expropriation for government purposes, while expropriation in the public 
interest would refer to expropriation for purposes that benefit the public.38  
                                                          
35 See in this regard Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3rd ed 2011) ch 3; Badenhorst P, 
Pienaar JM & Mostert H Silberberg & Schoeman’s The Law of Property (2006) 531-540 
36 President Cyril Ramaphosa Replies to Questions in the National Assembly – 14 March 2018. See the 
argument of Strydom J & Viljoen S ‘Unlawful Occupation of Inner-city Buildings: A Constitutional 
Analysis of the Rights and Obligations Involved’ (2014) 17 PELJ 1207-1621 for an argument in favour 
of the expropriation of inner-city buildings.  
37 See Slade BV ‘“Public Purpose or Public Interest” and Third Party Transfers’ (2014) 17 PELJ 166-
206 185. 
38 See Slade BV ‘“Public Purpose or Public Interest” and Third Party Transfers’ (2014) 17 PELJ 166-
206 185. 
The distinction between public purpose and public interest does not make that 
much difference where the property is acquired and in fact used by the state for the 
fulfilment of a particular purpose.39 However, there is a fundamental difference 
between an expropriation for a public purpose and an expropriation in the public 
interest where it concerns an expropriation involving a third party transfer.40 An 
expropriation involving a third party transfer for a public purpose may refer to the 
expropriation of property by the state and the transfer of such property to permit a 
private entity to construct transportation ports.41  
An expropriation involving a third party transfer in the public interest may refer to 
the expropriation of property by the state and the transfer of such property to private 
parties for purposes of land reform. As the motion only refers to expropriation of land 
in the public interest, the concern regarding the slow pace of land reform is placed 
under the spotlight. It is conceivable that the reference to public interest in the mandate, 
is limited to only investigate the expropriation of land for purposes of land reform 
without paying compensation, while the expropriation of land for fulfilling a public 
purpose would still attract compensation.  
 
 
The Constitution introduced a new framework for determining compensation. Section 
25(3) requires the amount of compensation to be ‘just and equitable, reflecting an 
equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected’. In 
determining just and equitable compensation, regard must be had to all relevant 
circumstances; and certain factors are listed. These factors include ‘the current use of 
the property;’ ‘the history of the acquisition and use of the property’; ‘the market value 
of the property;’ ‘the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition 
                                                          
39 See Slade BV ‘“Public Purpose or Public Interest” and Third Party Transfers’ (2014) 17 PELJ 166-
206; 184-185; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2011) 462. 
40 For an expose, see Slade BV ‘“Public Purpose or Public Interest” and Third Party Transfers’ (2014) 
17 PELJ 166-206. 
41 See the remark by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others 2010 (4) SA 242 (SCA) para 15: ‘[E]xpropriation of land 
in order to enable a private developer to construct low-cost housing is as much an expropriation for 
public purposes as it would be if the municipality or province had undertaken the task itself ...’  
The motion refers to the expropriation of land in the public interest without paying 
compensation. The state is prone to offer market value compensation, which may create 
the incorrect impression regarding the standard of compensation required by the 
Constitution. What then is the standard of compensation in the Constitution? What has 
the approach of the courts been with regard to that standard?  
and beneficial capital improvement of the property;’ and ‘the purpose of the 
expropriation.’ The list is not exhaustive, other factors may also be considered.42 The 
Constitution therefore rejects the position as cemented in the Expropriation Act 63 of 
1975, that compensation be determined with reference to the price that the property 
would have realised if sold ‘in the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer’.43  
In terms of the constitutional standard of compensation, namely ‘just and equitable’, 
market value is but one of the factors that may be considered, and is thus not decisive 
on its own. See for instance the articulation of this by Ngcukaitobi AJ in Msiza v 
Director-General, Department of Rural Development and Land Reform: ‘Market value 
is not the basis for the determination of compensation under section 25 of the 
Constitution … The departure point for the determination of compensation is justice 
and equity.’44 However, since market value is the only factor in section 25(3) that can 
be determined/quantified relatively easy, courts generally start with market value in 
assessing compensation.45 It then takes the other factors into account to adjust the 
compensation either upwards or downwards.46  
While this approach is questionable, since it does place market value at a certain 
vantage point, and may, as Langa ACJ pointed out in his minority judgment in Du Toit 
v Minister of Transport ‘continue to privilege market value at the expense of other 
considerations relevant to justice and equity’,47 the approach of the courts can probably 
not be faulted. There is no legislative framework to assist courts any further in 
determining just and equitable compensation.48 It is difficult to quantify factors such as 
‘the purpose of the expropriation’ in section 25(3)(e) or ‘the history of the acquisition 
and use of the property’ in section 25(3)(b). Courts need clearer guidelines in 
                                                          
42 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) para 28. 
43 S 12(1). 
44 2016 (5) SA 513 (LCC) para 29. In this decision, the Land Claims Court awarded compensation that 
was less than market value. However, the Supreme Court of Appeal (Uys NO v Msiza 2018 3 SA 440 
(SCA)) overturned the ruling of the Land Claims Court and awarded compensation equal to market value 
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market value. See also Pienaar JM “Land reform” Juta Quarterly Review 2017 (4)  
45 See Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) para 37; Ex parte Former Highland 
Residents: In re Ash and Others v Department of Land Affairs [2000] 2 All SA 26 (LCC) paras 34-35, 
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46 See Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) para 37; Ex parte Former Highland 
Residents: In re Ash and Others v Department of Land Affairs [2000] 2 All SA 26 (LCC) paras 34-35, 
75. 
47 Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) para 84. 
48 E du Plessis “Silence is Golden: The Lack of Direction on Compensation for Expropriation in the 2011 
Green Paper on Land Reform (2014) 17 PELJ 798-830 808. See also Van Wyk “Compensation for Land 
Reform Expropriation” 2017 TSAR 21-35 in general 
assessing compensation in terms of the Constitution. It is generally not the practice to 
include detailed provisions outlining precisely how factors relevant to the determination 
of compensation in a constitutional provision. Constitutional provisions contain broad 
rights, and may lay down certain standards relevant to those rights, which should be 
given further content in legislation and unpacked sufficiently by courts.49  
Despite numerous attempts parliament has been unable to pass a new 
expropriation act. The current Expropriation Act predates the Constitution by some 40 
years. Three Expropriation Bills (Expropriation Bill of 2008, Expropriation Bill of 2013, 
and the Expropriation Bill of 2015) have been through various stages in the legislative 
process, but have not been enacted into law. However, the provisions in the various 
Bills dealing with the calculation of compensation do not give clear guidance with 
regard to the calculation of just and equitable compensation with reference to the 
factors listed in section 25(3) of the Constitution. These Bills merely incorporate section 
25(3) of the Constitution verbatim. The 2008 Bill did, however, make it clear that 
compensation may, subject to the constitutional provision of justice and equity, be 
below market value. It further stated which factors may not be taken into account in 
determining just and equitable compensation. However, it goes no further in giving 
further content to the factors in section 25(3) and its application. 
In the absence of a newly promulgated Expropriation Act aligned with the 
Constitution, it is noteworthy that another legislative measure, already promulgated, 
may be of value concerning compensation and the expropriation of land for land reform 
purposes, namely the Property Valuation Act that commenced on 1 July 2014.50 The 
importance of the Act lies at two levels: firstly, it provides for the establishment of the 
Office of the Valuer-General, a source of and collection point for particular expertise 
regarding property valuation, approaches thereto and general data producing; and 
secondly, setting out an approach to market value where land is expropriated for land 
reform purposes. With regard to the latter, previous prices paid for acquisition of 
property or amounts of compensation where expropriation occurred by the state are 
ignored in calculating suitable compensation or determining the market value of 
property. To that end past escalations of prices and/or values are not extended and 
each transaction is to be approached afresh, but in light of the data collected by the 
Valuer-General. Aligned with the other factors listed in section 25(3) of the Constitution, 
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compensation paid at less than market-value, on a much more sustainable and 
affordable basis, is thus already possible. 
The ANC recently announced that it would expropriate property in terms of section 
25 of the Constitution without compensation in order to facilitate a ‘test case’.51 This 
step has to be viewed against the initial parameters for expropriation without 
compensation set out by Cyril Ramaphosa, namely that it does not impact negatively 
on food security or agricultural productivity.52 It has been argued that expropriation 
without compensation is in principle possible in terms of section 25(3), but that would 
depend on a very unique set of circumstances.53 Given this background, as well as 
acknowledging that ‘justice and equity’ is context-sensitive, it is thus unlikely that a test 
case would result in the establishment of blanket authority for the expropriation of 
property without compensation for purposes of land reform. Section 25(3) requires that 
compensation must reflect ‘an equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interest of those affected’ with reference to the listed factors. It would perhaps be 
prudent to unpack the factors in section 25(3) in legislation so that administrators and 
courts would be better equipped to determine in a specific context, whether a proper 
balance is struck between the public interest of, for instance implementing land reform, 
and the interest of those affected by the expropriation.  
It would therefore be advisable to follow a democratic process and promulgate 
legislation that unpacks the notion of ‘just and equitable compensation’ as well as the 
factors in section 25(3). In terms of section 25(8), it may be possible to set out the 
factors in such a manner that low (or very low, almost zero) compensation may be paid 
in order to achieve land reform.54 The constitutionality of the legislation can then be 
attacked for not complying with the constitutional provisions and further clarity can be 
obtained in that regard.  
Regardless, there appears to be a general duty on the state to pay compensation 
for an expropriation. The general duty would exist even in the absence of an explicit 
constitutional provision that provides for compensation.55  
                                                          
51 According to a Legalbrief Report on 4 June 2018 ‘[t]he more than 1 000 pending farm evictions in the 
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52 See motion on page 9 para 3.  
53 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3rd ed 2011) 506. 
54 Section 25(8) states that ‘[n]o provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative 
and other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past 
racially discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance 
with the provisions of section 36(1).’ 
55 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (3rd ed 2011) 505. 
Furthermore, expropriation without compensation blurs the boundaries between 
expropriation on the one hand and confiscation of property,56 on the other, with 
particular implications. Confiscation embodies a punitive element, carried out in the 
public interest.57 However, the approach to redress in the South African land reform 
programme is distinctively unique58 and does not incorporate a punitive element. This 
much was confirmed in various judgments,59 most notably by Justice Moseneke in 
Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa:60 
‘… compensation…is neither punitive nor retributive. It is not to be likened to a delictual 
claim aimed at awarding damages that are capable of precise computation of loss on a 
“but-for” basis… [Compensation is paid] out of public funds in order to find equitable 
redress to a tragic past. Ultimately, what is just and equitable must be evaluated not only 
from the perspective of the claimant but also of the State as the custodian of the national 
fiscus and the broad interests of society, as well as all those who might be affected by 
the order made.’61 
In this regard, expropriation without compensation (which is just another name for 
confiscation) is punitive in nature. There may be some benefits to acquiring land in this 
fashion, including for example, no or little direct costs of acquiring land.62 However, 
apart from not being authorised constitutionally, employing confiscation as a 
                                                          
56 Binswanger-Mkhize et al “Introduction and Summary” in Agricultural Land Redistribution 21; S 
Pazcakavambwa & V Hungwe “Land Redistribution in Zimbabwe” in Binswanger-Mkhize HP, 
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(3rd ed 2011) 311-314; L Ntsebeza “Land redistribution in South Africa: The property clause revisited” in 
L Ntsebeza & R Hall (eds) The Land Question in South Africa (2007) 107 122; Cliffe (2000) Review of 
African Political Economy 277-278; FED Belling Case studies of the changing interpretations of land 
restitution legislation in South Africa Magister Technologiae, University of South Africa (2008) 58-63.   
58 Pienaar JM “Land reform and restitution in South Africa: An embodiment of justice?” in De Ville J (ed) 
Memory and Meaning (2015) 141-160. 
59 Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2014 (6) SA 456 (CC) para 125. The same 
point was emphasised in Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) 
SA 199 (CC) para 68 where the court states: “The claim is against the state. It has a reparative and 
restitutionary character. It is neither punitive in the criminal sense nor compensatory in the civil law 
sense. Rather it advances a major public purpose and uses public resources in a manifestly equitable 
wat to deal with egregious an identifiable forms of historic hurt”. See also Pienaar JM Land Reform 
(2014) 521-525, 836-838.    
60 2014 (6) SA 456 (CC). 
61 Florence v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2014 (6) SA 456 (CC) para 125. 
62 Binswanger-Mkhize et al “Introduction and Summary” in Agricultural Land Redistribution 21. 
mechanism for acquiring land for redistributive purposes may have other undesirable 
consequences, such as ‘reduced investor confidence and an international backlash’.63 
Arguably, these consequences can also have a negative knock-on effect as the 
economy as a whole may be impacted on detrimentally, devaluating currency, which 
in turn could place additional burdens for the costs of land reform on the South African 
fiscus and citizens.64 At an international level confiscation of land was historically also 
linked to revolutionary political change, usually characterised by violence,65 which is 
not reconcilable with the constitutional aims and values embodied in the South African 
Constitution.  
 
 
The motion refers to the amendment of section 25 and any other provision to allow for 
the expropriation of land in the public interest without compensation. It has been 
argued above that section 25(2) and (3) of the Constitution would have to be amended 
to allow the state to expropriate land in the public interest without compensation. How 
that provision is to be amended to allow for compensation without expropriation within 
the specific parameters of the motion, does not fall in the ambit of our submission. 
However, if section 25(2) is amended to allow for expropriation of land in the public 
interest without compensation, it is necessary to consider what other provisions in the 
Bill of Rights would still permit an owner to challenge an expropriation without 
compensation. In this part, we briefly refer to other provisions in the Constitution that a 
litigant may use in order to attack the validity of an expropriation without compensation. 
Even if it is accepted that expropriation is a unique subset of deprivation that needs 
to comply with the specific requirements in section 25(2) as argued above, an owner 
may still argue (and the courts may potentially accept that argument) that an 
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If section 25(2) is amended to provide for expropriation without compensation, what 
other provision would have to be amended? 
expropriation without compensation constitutes an arbitrary deprivation in terms of 
section 25(1) and is invalid on that basis.  
In South African law, expropriation takes place exclusively by an administrative 
decision to expropriate property for a specific purpose. The decision to expropriate is 
therefore an administrative action,66 and can be reviewed in terms of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”), which gives effect to section 33 of the 
Constitution.67 The decision to expropriate property is generally separate from the 
decision regarding the compensation that would be payable. In Haffejee,68 the 
Constitutional Court accepted that compensation can be determined after the 
expropriation took place.69 Therefore, if a decision is made not to offer compensation 
because it is an expropriation in the public interest, it may be possible to review that 
decision in terms of administrative justice.  
Above it was pointed out that it is unclear what land would be susceptible to 
expropriation in the public interest without compensation. If expropriation of land in the 
public interest (for land reform purpose) is not compensated, but land expropriated for 
public purposes is compensated, it may be possible to argue that such a differentiation 
is a violation of the equality provision in section 9, and also in conflict with the rule of 
law principle in section 1 of the Constitution.  
If land is expropriated in the public interest without compensation, and the property 
owner concerned also lived in the house on the land, the expropriation of the land 
without compensation may conflict with section 26 of the Constitution, since it 
potentially takes away existing access to housing and may, potentially result in an 
arbitrary eviction.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Effectively implementing land reform depends on a number of factors. It requires 
constitutional legitimacy, clear policy guidelines, and effective implementation. It 
therefore requires a co-ordinated effort by all the relevant role players. The motion 
adopted by the National Assembly seems to point towards the constitutional provisions 
(specifically section 25, and potentially others as well) as an obstacle to achieve the 
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set land reform targets. In this submission, we have attempted to address some of the 
questions that arise from the adopted motion. 
In this submission, we have indicated that section 25 provides for radical land 
reform, and expressly permits expropriation for land reform purposes. Section 25(2) 
and (3) provide for just and equitable compensation in the case of any expropriation of 
property. To obtain the proper balance between the public interest and the interest of 
those affected by an expropriation in determining just and equitable compensation, the 
context of the particular case needs to be considered. For that reason, it would be 
appropriate to provide clear guidance to administrators and courts in legislative 
measures setting out exactly how compensation in specific circumstances should be 
calculated.  
It is highly questionable whether the expropriation of land in the public interest 
(i.e. for land reform purposes) without compensation would ever be acceptable in a 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. As shown above, 
the expropriation of land without compensation is basically confiscation, which is 
punitive in nature and contrary to the overall constitutional imperative of healing the 
divisions of the past and establishing a free and equal society. Furthermore, there is a 
general duty to compensate an owner for giving up his/her property for the benefit of 
the broader society. As argued above, there are also other constitutional rights that 
may be impacted if an amendment of section 25 is effected.  
We accept that it is important to accelerate land reform in order to reach the 
transformative aspirations of the Constitution and to relieve poverty. However, the tools 
for effective implementation of land reform exist. It is imperative that the tools be 
employed effectively and sustainably. In this context our submission is that the state 
should use its power to expropriate property for land reform purposes and then refrain 
from paying market value compensation as is currently the practice. Instead, the 
boundaries of just and equitable compensation ought to be scrutinised and tested. In 
light of budgetary constraints, we further submit that corruption and collusion around 
the sale and expropriation of property for land reform purposes, including inflated 
market values should be rooted out. Integral in the effective and sustainable utilisation 
of existing tools and mechanisms is good governance.   
We submit that the extant property clause, coupled by guidelines that enable 
functionaries and courts to unpack the calculation of compensation effectively, and 
endorsed by principles of good governance, can achieve the set reformative goals and 
objectives. 
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